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INFORMATION AS PROPERTY: DO
R UCKELSHA US AND CARPENTER




Informed by the Enlightenment tradition that influenced the drafters of
the United States Constitution, American intellectual property law has gen-
erally resisted regarding information as something in which its discoverer or
possessor can have a property interest.1 Trade secret law has long afforded
remedies to the possessor of secret information against those who use im-
proper means to obtain the secret and those who disclose it in violation of
confidential relationships, but the law has, in general, resisted characterizing
the secret itself as property.2
In a similar vein, copyright law does not protect information as such,
although it does protect the particular manner in which one expresses infor-
mation. In general, however, copyright law regards information as public
domain material that anyone may use without restriction. 3 Patent law also
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. This is a revised and anno-
tated version of a paper delivered at the Sixteenth Annual Telecommunications Policy Re-
search Conference held at Airlie, Virginia, on October 31, 1988.
1. See, e.g., Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy of International
News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 411 (1983) ("That information once
published should be presumptively free for all to use is a commonplace of intellectual property
law.").
2. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comments a and b (1939); infra notes 52-56
and accompanying text. Historically, the theft of intangibles, such as trade secrets, could not
be prosecuted as larceny. See Coffee, Hush! The Criminal Status of Confidential Information
After McNally and Carpenter and the Enduring Problem of Overcriminalization, 26 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 121, 134 (1988).
3. See, e.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 841 (1980); see also infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text. Occasionally, appropria-
tion of information about a celebrity has given rise to a successful claim that the celebrity's
"rights of publicity" have been violated. See, e.g., Unlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277
(D. Minn. 1970) (enjoining use of data about particular baseball players in a game). In gen-
eral, however, courts have resisted recognizing such claims. See, e.g., Hicks v. Casablanca
Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (use of biographical data about mystery writer in
fictional movies about her life not enjoined); Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal.3d
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places information concerning a patented invention in the public domain as
soon as the patent issues.4 A patent merely restricts certain uses of informa-
tion, for example, in manufacturing the invention, and then only for limited
times. Free dissemination of information, rather than its restriction through
property rights, consistently has been the goal of the federal intellectual
property law regime. This goal has been understood as implicit in the con-
stitutional clause to which the patent and copyright laws trace their heritage
in the American legal system.' That clause grants Congress the power "to
promote the progress of sciences and useful arts, by securing for limited
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings
and discoveries.",
6
Despite this recurring theme in intellectual property law, two recent
United States Supreme Court decisions classified information as private
property. In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,7 the Court decided that research
data submitted to a federal agency documenting the safety of the submitter's
product could be considered "property" within the meaning of the fifth
amendment to the Constitution. The Court held that the agency's use of
the data in connection with evaluating another firm's product or in making a
public release of the data could, under some circumstances, constitute a
"taking" of property for which the government must pay just compensation.
In Carpenter v. United States,9 the Court treated a reporter's knowledge of
the publication schedule and contents of his own newspaper column as the
"property" of the publisher.'o The Court concluded that the reporter fraud-
ulently misappropriated his employer's property when, based on the infor-
mation, he bought securities for his own commercial gain, thereby violating
federal mail and wire fraud statutes.'" Neither decision probed the property
issue very deeply, or explored its possible ramifications. Perhaps these cases
illustrate the old legal maxim: Hard cases make bad law. In both, equitable
considerations may have led the Court to stretch existing legal doctrine in
order to reach a just result. Or they may merely be aberrations in an other-
wise solid legal tradition wherein information cannot meaningfully be char-
860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979) (nephew of Rudolph Valentino not entitled to
enjoin use of Valentino's name, and data about him, in television production).
4. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974).
5. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION 37-39 (1986) [hereinafter
OTA REPORT].
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
7. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
8. Id. at 1003-04.
9. 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987).
10. Id. at 321-22.
11. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1982).
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acterized as property. Perhaps, however, these two cases are harbingers of a
new age, a new trend, a new attitude about the legal status of information,
one more appropriate to the Information Age that many commentators say
we have now entered.
12
In the Information Age, information becomes the primary economic com-
modity, the source of greatest wealth. 13 As a consequence, perhaps we have
outgrown the Enlightenment tradition which viewed information sharing as
the best means of increasing wealth and stimulating innovation. Perhaps
unwittingly, the Supreme Court, in the Ruckelshaus and Carpenter deci-
sions, may have initiated and contributed to a transformation in the legal
perspective on information as property.
While it may be argued that the time for a changed perspective has ar-
rived, the implications of such a transformation would be nothing short of
revolutionary. The upheaval would greatly affect existing intellectual prop-
erty and communications law regimes."4 The ramifications for social, cul-
tural, educational, and political institutions are almost unthinkably vast.' 5
Before courts extend these two decisions any further, they should give more
thought to the reasons why the law generally has not been receptive to "in-
formation as property" claims. Judges should take a closer look at the
weighty implications of any characterization of information as property
before applying such a doctrine unthinkingly to new cases and contexts.
Designating information as property is not without precedent in the his-
tory of intellectual property law. Over seventy years ago, the Supreme
Court, in a dispute over the right of a news service to appropriate news from
the subscribers of a rival service, decided to characterize the news (surely a
species of information) as the property of the gatherer.' 6 The case, Interna-
tional News Service v. Associated Press, wove property and unfair competition
rationales together in a tight mesh. Over time, this case has come to be
12. See, e.g., OTA REPORT, supra note 5, at 31-34; E. PLOMAN & L. HAMILTON, COPY-
RIGHT: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (1980). See generally A.
BRANSCOMB, WHO OWNS INFORMATION? (Gannett Center for Media Studies, Columbia Uni-
versity, Occasional Paper No. 2, 1986) (discussing societal implications of treating information
as commodity and as ownable property).
13. See, e.g., E. FEIGENBAUM & P. MCCORDUCK, THE FIFTH GENERATION: ARTIFI- "
CIAL INTELLIGENCE AND JAPAN'S COMPUTER CHALLENGE TO THE WORLD 14 (1983). See
generally D. BRANDIN & M. HARRISON, THE TECHNOLOGY WAR (1987).
14. The Office of Technology Assessment Report is one of the few recent works that at-
tempts to understand the far reaching implications of the new information economy for intel-
lectual property and communications law. See OTA REPORT, supra note 5.
15. The OTA Report also tries to grasp the implications of the information economy for
political, social and cultural institutions. Id. at 31-56.
16. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918).
19891
Catholic University Law Review
understood principally as an unfair competition case.' 7 As we try to under-
stand what the modern decisions granting property rights might mean, their
precursor is worth revisiting.
This Article begins by discussing why information generally has not been
regarded as property. Next, it analyzes the Ruckelshaus and Carpenter deci-
sions and their rationales for finding property rights in information. The
Article then revisits the historic International News Service case and its anal-
ysis of the property-interest-in-news issue, with particular focus on Justice
Holmes' separate opinion and Justice Brandeis' dissent that both raise seri-
ous questions as to the necessity and wisdom of recognizing property rights
in news. Finally, the Article returns to a discussion of the Ruckelshaus and
Carpenter decisions and their implications for the legal status of information
as property in the Information Age.
I. SOME REASONS WHY INFORMATION Is NOT GENERALLY
CHARACTERIZED AS PROPERTY
As a matter of common sense, certain characteristics of information make
it inherently difficult to recognize property rights in it. For one thing, stand-
ing alone, information has no tangible existence. It can, of course, be put in
some sort of tangible form, but recording it in a medium does not change its
essentially intangible character.' 8 A related problem involves the difficulty
of defining precisely what we mean by information, and of specifying the
types of information' 9 capable of being subjected to property interests.20 In-
formation is almost infinitely expandable and malleable, depending on how
17. See, e.g., E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE
PROCEss 34 (2d ed. 1979) ("The majority opinion in INS stands as the foundation for develop-
ment of the 'misappropriation' doctrine of unfair competition.").
18. The U.S. export control regulations concerning "technical data" recognize this princi-
ple. These regulations require an export control license for exchanges of technical data be-
tween U.S. citizens and foreign nationals, without regard to whether the data are in tangible
form (written on paper) or in intangible form (as in oral conversations) See 15 C.F.R. § 379.1
(1988). Copyright law, by contrast, only protects works of authorship if they have been
"fixed" in some tangible medium. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
19. "Information" is not an easy term to define with precision. Yet, at least some tenta-
tive definition of the term is necessary to address such questions as whether information is the
same as or different from data, knowledge, or rumor. For purposes of this Article, information
is defined as: discrete items of knowledge of a particular event or situation. See WEBSTER'S
3D NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1160 (1981).
20. See, e.g., Terrell & Smith, Publicity, Liberty, and Intellectual Property: A Conceptual
and Economic Analysis of the Inheritability Issue, 34 EMORY L.J. 1, 25-32 (1985) (discussing
the need for specificity before an interest is designated as a "property interest" in connection




individuals characterize it, and upon their purposes in having or using it."
In addition, information is inherently "leaky." It may be shared readily
by many people through virtually limitless forms of communication. Conse-
quently, information is very difficult to maintain in any exclusive manner
unless kept secret by its discoverer or possessor. Although one can bind
another in confidence not to disclose information, that bond is very different
from placing a physical object under lock and key.22 Once someone has
obtained information, he or she lacks the capacity to return it to its source.
In general, the more valuable the information, the more likely it is that
others will want to share it, or to seek ways of using it at odds with the
exclusivity its discoverer might wish to exert. Recent scandals over insider
trading,23 and situations in which Pentagon officials sold information about
military systems to defense contractors to enable the contractors to bid more
precisely on government contracts,24 exemplify the considerable value raw
information can have in our society.
We are also unaccustomed to thinking of information as the sort of thing
that can be property. A legal system implementing a decision to enforce
private property rights in raw information would face a formidable challenge
in persuading the populace to accept this novel notion, and might face mas-
sive problems in administration of the new regime of property rights.25 Per-
haps the very difficulty of conceptualizing the far reaching implications of
such a regime explains why the American legal system generally resists char-
acterizing information as property.
One can construct an argument, however, for treating information as
property, at least under some circumstances. John Locke's theory of prop-
erty holds that one can acquire property rights in something not already
owned by virtue of the labor expended to gather or produce it.26 Gathering
21. See OTA REPORT, supra note 5, at 158-71.
22. See Baird, supra note 1, at 413-14 (discussing differences between exclusive rights in
tangible things and exclusive rights in information).
23. See, e.g., Goelzer & Berueffy, Insider Trading: The Search for a Definition, 39 ALA.
L. REV. 491, 498-510 (1988) (discussing the current insider trading law based on the misap-
propriation theory, which finds a violation when a person or company misappropriates and
uses non-public information belonging to another for their own advantage).
24. See, e.g., Details of Defense Probe Remain Shrouded: Disclosures So Far Suggest a
Complex Web of Information-Dealing-Conspiracies, Wash. Post, June 26, 1988, at A6, col. 1.
25. See OTA REPORT, supra note 5, at 208-09 (discussing parallel enforcement problems
with copyright protection).
26. See J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT §§ 27-28 (P. Laslett 2d ed. 1967)
(3d ed. 1698). The "sweat of the brow" theory for protecting compilations of information
through copyright law, see infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text, seems to reflect the Lock-
ean view, see, e.g., Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co., 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950). This theory
also permeates International News Serv. discussed infra notes 144-59 and accompanying text.
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information can certainly require labor, and may, in fact, be a very expensive
and time-consuming task. As with other goods obtained through an expen-
diture of labor, information often has a substantial exchange value. Those
who do not have it may be willing to pay large sums to acquire it.2 7 This
was true long before the Information Age commenced and will continue to
be true in any post-Information Age society.
Examining the "information as property" issue from a legal perspective,
one can see that information may share some attributes commonly associ-
ated with other forms of property. The term property has a flexible meaning
in the law, and is often used to describe the holder's "bundle of rights" in
something.28 Depending on the nature of the subject and on the nature of
the person's interest in it, the bundle may be thicker or thinner, but need not
have a particular thickness to rise to the status of property. While it is diffi-
cult to define with precision what we mean by property, it is still possible to
make some generalizations about the most important kinds of rights that
tend to be found in the property bundle: (1) rights of possession, use, and
enjoyment; (2) rights of transfer; and (3) rights to exclude others.29
Information cannot be possessed in the same way that one can possess
land or a jewel, but it does not unduly strain the definition of the word to say
that a person can "possess" information. Holders of information also may
use, enjoy, buy, and sell it, give it away, or license its use. At least when
those who know certain information can be persuaded to hold their tongues,
others may be excluded from acquiring it. Information, in other words, can
share essential qualities associated with other forms of property.
The intangibility of information alone does not disqualify it, for copyright
and patent law have recognized exclusive rights in certain intangible aspects
of works once certain requirements are met.3' For example, a playwright
See also Baird, supra note 1, at 415-23 (discussing natural rights theories for intellectual prop-
erty protection).
27. See, e.g., supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. Having an exchange value alone
does not make something "property." See, e.g., Minniear v. Tors, 266 Cal. App. 2d 495, 72
Cal. Rptr. 287 (1968) ("idea" may be "sold" by contract, but contractual arrangement does
not create property interest in the idea).
28. See J. CRIBBET & C. JOHNSON, CASES & MATERIALS ON PROPERTY 1-5, 32-54 (5th
ed. 1984); R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 1.2
(law. ed. 1984)(discussing Hohfeldian conception of property, endorsed in the RESTATEMENT
OF PROPERTY, as an aggregate of rights and interests).
29. Emphasizing the importance of these core property rights, Judge Posner, for example,
believes that legal enforcement of exclusivity and transferability rights in property, and private
ownership of most of society's resources, create incentives that promote optimum economic
efficiency. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 39-41 (3rd ed. 1986).
30. The question of whether intellectual property is really property, and, if so, why it is so
classified has not received much attention in American law. One of the few scholars to have
addressed the issue observed:
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may infringe a copyright in a dramatic work despite the fact that the second
play takes no dialogue from the first play, if there are elaborate structural
similarities between the works.3 A firm may infringe a patent if it builds a
machine equivalent to that described in the patent, even if that machine ap-
pears to be quite different from the patentee's machine. 32
In common with other intangible intellectual products, information has
the "public goods" problem that a grant of property rights may partially
rectify. One common characteristic of certain kinds of public goods is that
use by one person does not diminish the supply available to others once the
good is produced.33 Because such public goods may not be physically
scarce, it can be difficult to create incentives to produce them, in that the
exclusivity necessary to recoup production expenses is difficult to maintain.
The property rights granted by copyright and patent law artificially create a
kind of scarcity for qualified intellectual products in order to improve incen-
tives for creating these kinds of socially desirable public goods. 34 Creating
property rights in information arguably might do the same thing, that is,
improve incentives for producing and distributing information, a socially de-
sirable category of public goods. The law's general rule against enforcing
private rights in information thus does not arise from some inherent incapac-
ity of information to be property but from a policy choice against character-
izing it as property.
In large measure, copyright and patent laws' scrupulous avoidance of pro-
tecting information is traceable to the belief of the framers of the Constitu-
tion that unfettered and widespread dissemination of information would
To say that copyright is "property," although a fundamentally unhistorical state-
ment, would not be baldly misdescriptive if one were prepared to acknowledge that
there is property and property with few if any legal consequences extending uni-
formly to all species and that in practice the lively questions are likely to be whether
certain consequences ought to attach to two given circumstances .... But character-
ization in grand terms then seems of little value: we may as well go directly to the
policies activating or justifying the particular determinations.
B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 74 (1967); see also Gordon, An Inquiry
Into the Merits of Copyright, 41 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 1989). The issue of whether a
similar intangible interest is "property," or some other kind of right has arisen in connection
with the right of publicity. See Samuelson, Reviving Zacchini-" Analyzing First Amendment
Defenses in Right of Publicity and Copyright Cases, 57 TUL. L. REV. 836, 838-54 (1983); see
also Terrell & Smith, supra note 20, at 25-32.
31. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d. Cir. 1936).
32. See, e.g., O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1854).
33. See, e.g., A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION THEORY IN USE
251-54 (1969). Not all "public goods" are inexhaustible, (e.g. national defense resources),
although intellectual products tend to have this characteristic.
34. See Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. REV.
1329, 1336-38 (1987).
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promote technological and economic progress. The drafters of the Constitu-
tion, educated in the Enlightenment tradition, shared that era's legacy of
faith in the enabling powers of knowledge for society as well as the individ-
ual. 35 They viewed free access to knowledge as an essential step in building
the fledgling nation. Intellectual property policy was an integrated part of
the plan to promote a wide range of social, political, and economic goals.3 6
Granting exclusive rights to authors and inventors was thought to provide
needed incentives to encourage innovation, while simultaneously promoting
free and widespread dissemination of information.37
A related reason why patent and copyright law have not protected infor-
mation is that there are other aspects of an intellectual creation, besides the
information, that the laws could protect. A copyright protects a writing's
"expression," not the facts contained in the writing.38 A patent does not
protect an inventor's discovery; it only prevents the invention from being
"practiced" by others during the seventeen year life of the patent without the
patentee's permission. 39 Although "information" is not one of the aspects of
a copyrighted work which section 102(b) of the current copyright statute
35. See B. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 129-37
(1967) (tracing Enlightenment influences on American intellectual property law). The hopes
of the founders for the U.S. intellectual property system appear to have been realized. In the
century and a half following the framing of the Constitution, creative, technological, and scien-
tific endeavor have flourished. See OTA REPORT, supra note 5, at 38.
36. There was, among those who followed the Enlightenment tradition, a "close associa-
tion of technology with democracy .... A democratic polity was thought to be a prerequisite
to advancement in applied science, while technological achievements were expected to provide
the physical means of achieving the democratic objectives of political, social, and economic
equality." OTA REPORT, supra note 5, at 39.
37. As the Office of Technology Assessment reported to Congress:
Although the ruling monarchs of Europe had regarded the widespread dissemination
of information with considerable alarm, the opposite view prevailed in the United
States. Building a nation required the establishment of communication links, the
development of a unified market, the forging of a common culture, and the building
of a democratic polity. The widespread flow of information was essential to accom-
plish these tasks, and the establishment of an intellectual property system, they be-
lieved, would aid the creation and spread of information. Appreciative of the
potential that information held for fostering national development, the Founding Fa-
thers saw the granting of intellectual property rights, not as a natural right, but as a
statutory, or positive right, in this case granted to promote learning.
Id. at 37.
38. Expression is the metaphor copyright law uses to describe the form in which the crea-
tor of copyrighted work fixes information. See, e.g., 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 13.03 (1988).
39. Patentees have the exclusive right to make, use, or sell their inventions for 17 years.
35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982).
[Vol. 38:365
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expressly states that it will not protect,' ° it is well established that copyright
cannot protect information.4 1 Copyright law regards the information in
published works as public domain material.42 Statements abound in copy-
right cases and commentary identifying the goal of copyright as promotion
of learning and widespread dissemination of knowledge. 43 Refusing to en-
force property rights in information itself is believed to aid in achieving these
objectives.
Despite the copyright principle against protecting information, judges
have, on occasion, applied copyright law in a way that makes it difficult to
distinguish between protecting expression and protecting information. This
is particularly true in the area of compilations of information. Although the
copyright statute strains to define what a compilation copyright can cover
without including information,' namely, the selection and arrangement of
the information, in individual cases it can prove very difficult to implement
the rule.4 5 When information widely available to the public is compiled in a
single source, the "sweat of the brow" of the compiler may be all that sepa-
rates unprotected information from protected expression.46
On the patent side, free dissemination of knowledge is also a goal of the
system. Although people hardly write patents to be read as others write
novels, a fundamental principle of the American patent system from its in-
ception has been that, as a prerequisite to issuance of a patent, a prospective
patentee must be prepared to disclose how to make his or her invention-
indeed the best mode of making the invention-in a way that an ordinary
40. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982) (excluding from copyright protection ideas, concepts, and
methods of operation, among other things).
41. See Harper and Row Publishers v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985).
42. Id. It is worth noting that the Court in this case found copyright infringement be-
cause the Nation had taken too much "expression" from an unpublished, copyrighted work,
but the Court left open the possibility that a fair use defense might succeed where only infor-
mation was taken from an unpublished manuscript. See id. at 556-57, 568-69.
43. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 431-32
(1984); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
841 (1980).
44. Compilation is defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101 as: "[A] work formed by the collection and
assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in
such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship." 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1982). Section 103 goes on to make clear that the "copyright in a compilation
... extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from
the preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the
preexisting material." Id. § 103.
45. See, e.g., Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1977) (taking of
name, city, and zip code, but no other descriptive elements, of a list of gardening outlets was
infringement of copyright).
46. See supra note 26 and accompanying text; see also OTA REPORT, supra note 5, at 73-
1989]
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person skilled in the field could follow.47 Disclosure of this information is
often said to be the quid pro quo the public receives in exchange for the
grant of exclusive rights to the inventor.4 8 Although others are forbidden to
make, use, or sell the invention for the seventeen years of the patent's life,49
the patent system makes available immediately the knowledge revealed in
the patent which can spur additional innovation,50 often by persons other
than the patentee. Follow-on inventors may obtain patents for their im-
provements on the original invention. When improvement patents issue, the
new knowledge embodied in them also becomes available to the public.5'
The patent system anticipates that this process will continue indefinitely,
bringing about continuing technological progress.
Trade secret law has come the closest to designating information as prop-
erty. Indeed, some cases expressly call trade secrets property. 52 The more
accepted view, however, has not regarded trade secrets in this way.53 Ac-
cording to Justice Holmes' classic formulation in E.I. Du Pont de Nemours
Powder Co. v. Masland,54 protection flows from basic notions of fair and
equitable conduct. Hence, when one acquires commercially valuable infor-
mation through a confidential relationship, the law will not suffer abuse of
the confidence by unauthorized disclosure of the information to the eco-
nomic detriment of the confider."
47. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982) (detailing patent specification and disclosure requirements).
The patent specification remains confidential until the patent issues, however. Id. § 122.
48. See, e.g., A.F. Stoddard & Co. v. Dann, 564 F.2d 556, 563 (D.C. Cir. 1977); P. Ro-
SENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 1.02 (1982).
49. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982).
50. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974); see also text ac-
companying note 4. See generally 2 D. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS §§ 7.01-.05 (1988)
(discussing disclosure requirements).
51. See generally 2 D. CHISUM, supra note 50, at §§ 7.01-.05 (discussing disclosure re-
quirements). Improvements on prior inventions are patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)
during the life of the patent on the underlying invention even if made by someone other than
the patentee. The owner of an improvement patent, however, must obtain the permission of
the underlying patent's owner to practice his or her improvement if, in order to make the
improvement, one must make the underlying invention as well. See 3 D. CHISUM, supra note
50, at § 9.03[2][b]; 4 D. CHISUM, supra note 50, at § 16.02 [1][a].
52. Milgrim cites cases to this effect at 1 R. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS
§ 1.01 [2], at 1-8 to 1-15 & n.15 (1988). Milgrim has no hesitation about characterizing trade
secrets as property. Not all the cases he cites, however, stand for the proposition that trade
secrets are property. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
53. The American Law Institute rejected a property characterization for trade secrets.
See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comments a & b (1939). The Restatement position has
been widely accepted as the proper statement of trade secret law. See infra notes 55, 89-91 and
accompanying text.
54. 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917).
55. Justice Holmes wrote:
The word "property" as applied to trademarks and trade secrets is an unanalyzed
[Vol. 38:365
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Breach of confidence or use of improper means to obtain a trade secret are
the two principal trade secret violations.56 It is simply unnecessary to call
trade secrets "property" to enforce confidences and penalize those who use
improper means to obtain a valuable secret. That it is also consistent with
prevailing Enlightenment philosophy not to regard information as property
probably helps to explain why even trade secret law has resisted use of the
property label.
This section has introduced traditional attitudes of intellectual property
law toward the protection of information. In sum, courts have rarely found
it necessary to sacrifice the policy of free dissemination of information in
order to promote creative endeavor and to protect reasonable exclusivity.
The decisions discussed in the next two sections display the Supreme Court's
recent remarkable willingness to depart from this tradition, and to recognize
exclusive private interests in information.
II. R UCKELSHA US V. MONSANTO Co.: INFORMATION AS PROPERTY IN A
GOVERNMENTAL "TAKING"
The property issue in the Ruckelshaus case arose in connection with a
broad-based attack by Monsanto on a congressional scheme regulating the
uses to which the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) could put re-
search data Monsanto had submitted concerning certain pesticides. Mon-
santo claimed that the EPA's use of its data violated its rights under the fifth
amendment to the Constitution. 7
Monsanto manufactures pesticides and other chemical products for use in
agriculture. Because environmental hazards from widespread use of toxic
chemicals in pesticides manifested themselves in the past, Congress empow-
ered the EPA to oversee use of these substances.5 8 As part of this function,
the EPA requires a manufacturer wishing to market a particular pesticide to
submit data demonstrating that the substance will not harm the environ-
expression of certain secondary consequences of the primary fact that the law makes
some rudimentary requirements of good faith. Whether the plaintiffs have any valua-
ble secret or not the defendant knows the facts, whatever they are, through a special
confidence that he accepted. The property may be denied bht the confidence cannot
be. Therefore the starting point for the present matter is not property or due process
of law, but that the defendant stood in confidential relations with the plaintiffs, or
one of them.
Id. at 102. The modem view follows the reasoning of Justice Holmes in Masland and does not
regard trade secrets as property. See E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE
COMPETITIVE PROCESS 505 (3d ed. 1986).
56. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
57. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 998-99 (1984).
58. The history of relevant congressional action is set out in Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 990-
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ment. The EPA reviews this data, and if satisfied with the manufacturer's
showing, approves the pesticide for sale. 5
9
Whether EPA can use the data for any other purpose, particularly in eval-
uating the application of a competitor to sell chemically identical substances,
or in releasing the data to the public when concerns arise about the safety of
the pesticide, has generated considerable controversy.6" Naturally, the first
applicant to gain approval of a particular pesticide would prefer to put any
subsequent applicant to the expense and effort of replicating the research
efforts. The longer it takes a competitor to do this research, and the more
expensive the effort, the greater the first company's competitive edge in the
marketplace. Therefore, the first applicant may be expected to have serious
objections to EPA's reuse of the data in connection with a subsequent appli-
cation (which would, in effect, allow a subsequent applicant to take "a free
ride" on the research expenses the first applicant incurred), and even more
serious objections to public disclosure of the data.
On the other hand, a competitor might argue that replication of the re-
search is socially wasteful when EPA already has in its files sufficient data to
determine the safety of the chemical. The competitor might also argue that
the public interest would be served by allowing more competition in the pes-
ticide market, that is, by allowing subsequent applicants to obtain EPA ap-
proval so that more pesticide products could be made available on the
market at a lower price. This argument is especially strong where the pesti-
cide is unpatented. Over the years, Congress has debated the issue of how to
balance the public and private interests at stake in restricting or disclosing
pesticide safety data.6 The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA) has undergone a series of amendments to deal with this prob-
lem and to achieve an equitable balance.62
As relevant to the Ruckelshaus case, there have been three basic phases in
59. 7 U.S.C. § 136a (1982).
60. See, e.g., Abramson, Confidential Business Information Versus the Public's Right to
Disclosure, 34 U. KAN. L. REV. 681 (1986); see also Mobay Chemical Corp. v. Costle, 447 F.
Supp. 811 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (prohibiting EPA from disclosing trade secrets and other confi-
dential information contained in test data); Chevron Chemical Co. v. Costle, 443 F. Supp.
1024 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
61. The Supreme Court discusses the history of this debate in its analysis of whether the
government had taken Monsanto's data for a "public purpose," as required by the fifth amend-
ment. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1014-16.
62. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 92-516, § 3(c)(1)(D), 86 Stat. 973, 979-80 (1972); Pub. L. No.
94-140, § 12, 89 Stat. 751, 755 (1975); Pub. L. No. 95-396, § 2, 92 Stat. 819, 820 (1978); Pub.
L. No. 100-532, § 102, 102 Stat. 2654, 2655-67 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C.
§§ 136a(c)(2)(data submittal), 136h (data disclosure)(1982 & Supp. IV 1986)); see also S. REP.




the government's policy on EPA's use of this data. The first phase was from
1947-1972. During this period, FIFRA was silent about what the govern-
ment could do with safety data submitted regarding particular pesticides.63
The second phase was from 1972-1978, when FIFRA explicitly provided
that a submitter of safety data could designate submitted data as trade
secrets or confidential information. 64 FIFRA forbade EPA to release such
data to the public without the submitter's permission. 65 As to EPA's use of
the data in connection with another application, the law required a subse-
quent applicant to offer "reasonable compensation" to the first applicant.66
If the two firms were unable to agree as to what constituted "reasonable
compensation," EPA, subject to judicial review, could set an amount.67
Once reasonable compensation had been paid, the law would in effect imply
a license for EPA to use the data in considering a competitor's application.
Data designated as trade secrets were, however, exempt from this mandatory
licensing provision.68
Congress again amended FIFRA in 1978.69 In its third phase, FIFRA
provided that for ten years, certain types of research data submitted to the
EPA could not be used by the agency in connection with another application
for the same pesticide.70 The amendment also created a fifteen year entitle-
ment to "reasonable compensation" for EPA's use of research data in con-
nection with subsequent applications. 71 A new applicant was supposed to
63. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), Pub. L. No.
80-104, 61 Stat. 167 (1947), (reprinted in 7 U.S.C.A. § 135b(a)(4) (1980)) (subsequently
amended by Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (1972) (adding 7 U.S.C. §§ 136a-136y to ch. 5));
Letter from John J. Flynn, Professor of Law, Univ. of Utah, to Hon. Philip A. Hart, Chairman
of the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, Committee on the Judiciary (Feb. 9,
1972) (discussing the state of the law with respect to the protection of submitted test data prior
to the 1972 FIFRA amendments) (reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
4101); see also Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 990-91 & n.3.
64. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136h(a) (1976) (subsequently amended by Pub. L. No. 95-396,
§ 15, 92 Stat. 819, 829 (1978) (as amended)); see also Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 991-93.
65. 7 U.S.C. § 136h(b) (1976) (subsequently amended by Pub. L. No. 95-396, § 15, 92
Stat. 819, 829 (1978) (as amended)). A provision, however, allowed the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) to challenge the trade secret characterization of the data. Id. § 136h(c).
66. Id. § 136a(c)(1)(D).
67. Id.
68. Id. § 136a(a)(c)(2); see also Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1010-11.
69. Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-396, 92 Stat. 819 (1978)(as subsequently
amended). On October 25, 1988, President Reagan signed into law yet another amendment to
FIFRA concerning procedures for compensating the original submitter of data when a subse-
quent applicant seeks consideration of this data in connection with its application for approval.
See Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-532, 102 Stat. 2654 (1988).
70. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(D)(i) (1982); see also Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 994 & n.4.
71. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(l)(D)(ii) (1982).
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negotiate compensation with the original submitter. If negotiations failed,
the parties would resolve the dispute in arbitration.7 2 The EPA was also
granted authority to make public disclosures of the data where necessary to
protect public health.73 Both the compensation and public disclosure provi-
sions, as well as those involving the use of the data for other applications,
contemplated an override of the trade secret exemption that had been part of
the 1972 law.74
Monsanto's lawsuit challenged the entire FIFRA statutory scheme re-
garding data use and data disclosure as a taking of Monsanto's property by
the government without an adequate public purpose, without due process of
law, and without just compensation, as the fifth amendment to the Constitu-
tion requires. 75
The Supreme Court first addressed whether Monsanto had a property in-
terest in the data submitted to EPA.76 Given the language of the fifth
amendment, without a property interest, there could be no constitutional
violation. Monsanto's claim of a property interest in the data rested princi-
pally on the large expenditures it incurred in compiling the data for submis-
sion to EPA (estimated at more than $23.6 million over the years).7 7 The
data, Monsanto claimed, not only gave Monsanto a competitive edge be-
cause of the EPA approvals, but could also be used in developing additional
end-use products for the chemicals and in expanding the uses of registered
products.78 In order to protect the data, which Monsanto's competitors
would find very valuable if they could obtain it, Monsanto had set up strin-
gent security measures.79 Monsanto also relied on some Missouri case law,
arguing that it characterized trade secrets as property.80
For. reasons difficult to understand, not only did EPA not challenge the
contention that Monsanto had certain property rights in the safety data sub-
mitted to the government, it went so far as to stipulate that Monsanto had
72. Id. The Court in Ruckelshaus also examined whether the FIFRA compensation
scheme qualified as "just compensation." See 467 U.S. at 1016-20.
73. 7 U.S.C. § 136h (1982).
74. See S. REP. No. 335, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 13, 17 (1977); H.R. REP. No. 663, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess., 15-16, 32-34, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1966,
1988-89, 2005-07; see also Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1006.
75. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 998-99.
76. Id. at 1000.
77. Id. at 998.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See Reddi-Wip, Inc. v. Lemay Valve Co., 354 S.W.2d 913 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962); Har-
rington v. National Outdoor Advertising Co., 355 Mo. 524, 196 S.W.2d 786 (1946); Luckett v.




such rights.8 This stipulation surely had an effect on the Court's analysis of
the issue. Despite the stipulation, and in part because of the Court's uncer-
tainty about its exact import, the Supreme Court decided to address the
"trade-secret-as-property" issue, noting that it was the first time such an
issue had been squarely presented to the Court.82 The Court began its analy-
sis of the issue by reminding itself of the need to heed state law in analyzing
property interests under the fifth amendment to the Constitution.83 The
Court then noted favorably Monsanto's assertion that its safety data "[were]
property under Missouri law, which recognizes trade secrets as defined in
§ 757, comment b, of the Restatement of Torts, as property."84 The Court
cited three Missouri cases in support of this statement.8 5
Curiously, while it is true that in two of the three cases cited by the Court,
Missouri courts endorsed the Restatement of Torts definition of trade se-
cret,8 6 in neither of these two cases did the Missouri courts hold that trade
secrets are property.87 The Missouri Supreme Court decided the third case
twenty-two years before the Restatement was published, and therefore could
not have recognized that definition.88 Nor does the Restatement of Torts
81. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1001. But see infra notes 99-107 and accompanying text
(discussing EPA's apparent waffling on this point).
82. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1001.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1001 (citing Reddi-Wip, 354 S.W.2d at 913; Harrington, 355 Mo. at 524, 196
S.W.2d at 786; Luckett, 271 Mo. at 289, 196 S.W. at 740).
86. See Reddi-Wip, 354 S.W.2d at 917; Harrington, 355 Mo. at 532, 196 S.W.2d at 791.
87. Both Reddi- Wip and Harrington involved claims of breaches of confidential relation-
ships, breaches of agreements concerning inventions, and charges of inequitable conduct. In
Reddi- Wip, the court found that the information that the plaintiff claimed as a trade secret had
been revealed in a patent, and therefore was in the public domain. 354 S.W.2d at 917-18. In
Harrington, the plaintiff's invention had been patented by one of the defendants who had
wrongfully gotten the invention from the plaintiff. 355 Mo. at 533, 196 S.W.2d at 792. Both
Reddi-Wip and Harrington are classic unfair competition cases.
88. The third case upon which Monsanto relied, Luckett, 271 Mo. at 289, 196 S.W. at
740, is also a classic unfair competition case, resting upon charges of various types of inequita-
ble conduct. Only once in the midst of a lengthy discussion of the circumstances of the dis-
pute, does the court refer to a trade secret as property. Id. at 302-04, 196 S.W. at 743. This
single passing reference cannot fairly be interpreted as a holding by the Missouri court that
trade secrets are property. But even if this was a fair interpretation of Luckett, it would be
overridden by later Missouri decisions which expressly adopt the RESTATEMENT definition of
trade secrets. Consistent with the RESTATEMENT, these decisions clearly predicate liability for
appropriation of trade secrets upon use of improper means to obtain the secret rather than on
a violation of property rights. See, e.g., Reddi-Wip, 354 S.W.2d at 917 (citing E.I. Du Pont de
Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757
comment a; see also National Rejectors, Inc. v. Trieman, 409 S.W.2d 1, 18-19 (Mo. 1966)(cit-
ing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b in defining trade secrets); Ultra-Life Laborato-
ries v. Eames, 221 S.W.2d 224, 232 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949)(same). Milgrim also cited these three
cases in support of his thesis that trade secrets are property. Many of the other citations in his
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speak of trade secrets as property. Quite to the contrary, the Restatement
twice expressly rejects a property characterization for trade secrets.89
Moreover, the most recent Missouri case cited by the Court in support of
the contention that trade secrets are property according to Missouri law can
more appropriately be interpreted to reject a property label for trade secrets.
In that case, although acknowledging that courts have sometimes referred to
trade secrets as property, the Missouri Court of Appeals cited Justice
Holmes' decision in Du Pont 9° and section 757, comment a, of the Restate-
ment of Torts, for the proposition that the real rationale for imposing liabil-
ity for trade secret indiscretions derived from the duty of good faith and the
duty not to employ improper means to obtain the trade secret. 9' Thus,
"footnote 15" are equally poor precedents to support his assertion. See 1 R. MILGRIM, MIL-
GRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.01[2] n.15 (1988); infra note 91.
89. Comment a of § 757 states this in no uncertain terms:
The suggestion that one has a right to exclude others from the use of his trade secret
because he has a right of property in the idea has been frequently advanced and
rejected. The theory that has prevailed is that the protection is afforded only by a
general duty of good faith and that the liability rests upon breach of this duty....
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment a (1939); see also id. comment b ("rule stated in this
section rests not upon a view of trade secrets as physical objects of property, but rather upon
abuse of confidence or impropriety in learning the secret").
90. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
91. Reddi-Wip, 354 S.W.2d at 917. Milgrim cites Reddi-Wip, Harrington, and Luckett, as
cases supporting his contention that trade secrets are property. See I R. MILGRIM, supra note
52, at § 1.01[2] n.15. As discussed supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text, the three cases
do not really support that characterization. Milgrim's treatise contains eight pages of case
citations as authority for his contention that virtually all jurisdictions recognize trade secrets
as property. While only an exhaustive search of each and every case would reveal if all really
hold that trade secrets are property, this Article's examination of the three Missouri cases cited
by Monsanto and Milgrim on this point should raise some questions about the validity of the
assertion. The author selected three other jurisdictions, and surveyed the cases cited by Mil-
grim in his "footnote 15" to determine if those references suffer from analytical shortcomings
similar to Milgrim's Missouri citations.
With respect to Colorado, Milgrim cites Julius Hyman & Co. v. Velsicol Corp., 123 Colo.
563, 602, 233 P.2d 977, 998 (1951). This case, like the Missouri cases discussed above, is a
classic unfair competition case, with multiple charges of stolen inventions and trade secrets by
former employees bound by both contract and fiduciary relationships not to make use of the
inventions and secrets to the employer's detriment. As with Luckett, this case contains but one
incidental reference to property rights in an invention or discovery within a discussion of issues
not in contention in the case. Id.
For support from Oklahoma, Milgrim cites Amoco Prod. Co. v. Lindley, 609 P.2d 733, 746
(Okla. 1980). The Amoco case is unusual, in that Lindley, an employee, had signed a written
agreement with Amoco, his employer, which Amoco claimed granted it property rights in any
of Lindley's discoveries or inventions created during the term of employment. Id. at 736.
While review of the case makes clear that the trial judge regarded Amoco as vested with some
form of property rights in a computer system Lindley developed after leaving Amoco's em-
ploy, id. at 742, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma reversed and remanded, concluding that
Amoco was not entitled to injunctive relief because it had not shown a contractual property
right to the system, and that the evidence did not establish appropriation of a trade secret. Id.
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neither the Missouri cases nor the Restatement section upon which the
Supreme Court relied stood for the proposition that trade secrets are prop-
erty under Missouri law.
After making several other general observations about trade secret law,
the Court attempted to reinforce the property characterization of trade
secrets, noting that they were assignable, could form the res of a trust, and
could pass to a trustee in bankruptcy.92 The Court then cited fragments of
two statements in the legislative history of FIFRA indicating congressional
recognition of some property interest in safety data submitted to EPA.9 3
The trade-secret-as-property discussion concluded with a general statement
that the term property can include more than land and tangible goods, a'
proposition for which the Court resorted to Blackstone's 19th century Com-
mentaries on the Laws of England,94 and Locke's Second Treatise on
Government."
Although this is all that the Court said in the text on the trade-secrets-as-
property issue, the section on this topic concludes with an observation that,
in prior fifth amendment cases, other kinds of intangible rights, such as liens
on property and contracts, had been found to be property within the mean-
ing of the fifth amendment. 96 This persuaded the Court that Monsanto's
at 745-46. The supreme court described an employer's interest in a trade secret as "proprie-
tary," consciously distinguishing it from a contractual interest, which it described as a "prop-
erty" right. Id. at 746. Notably, the supreme court also invoked the RESTATEMENT definition
of a trade secret. Id. at 743. Thus, Amoco does not squarely hold that a trade secret is prop-
erty, but rather, embraces the RESTATEMENT formulation of abuse of confidential relation-
ship.
The Wyoming case upon which Milgrim relies is Ridley v. Krout, 63 Wyo. 252, 273-74, 180
P.2d 124, 131 (1947). Ridley involved the enforceability of a covenant not to compete between
a repair shop and one of its employees who the shop personnel had trained, and who later
entered the repair business himself. The court held the covenant unreasonable and unenforce-
able. The reference to a trade secret as property appears in the midst of a lengthy quote within
a series of quotes from other authorities. The specific reference is from a 1916 case from an
unnamed jurisdiction. Id. Again, Milgrim misleads because Ridley offers no real analysis or
holding on the trade secret as property issue. On balance, Milgrim's assertion is not as
strongly supported as his imposing string-citation suggests.
92. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984). The Court here follows the
property analysis utilized by Milgrim. See 1 R. MILGRIM, supra note 52, § 1.02 - .08.
93. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1002; S. REP. No. 334, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1977);
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1560, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 29, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1966, 2045.
94. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1003 (citing 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *405).
95. Id. at 1003 (citing J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, ch.5
(J. Gough ed. 1947)).
96. Id. (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 44, 46 (1960) (materialman's lien
provided for under Maine law protected by taking clause); United States v. General Motors
Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945) ("property" as used in the taking clause has been construed
as a group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical thing, such as the right to
1989]
Catholic University Law Review
trade secret interest in the safety data submitted to the EPA could also be
property within the meaning of the fifth amendment.97 The Court discerned
no difference between the types of intangible rights it identified and trade
secrets, overlooking the significant fact that these other rights are stable,
vested, and enforceable in ways that trade secrets are not. Liens, for exam-
ple are enforceable after other persons know about them, whereas trade
secrets "disappear" when revealed outside of a confidential relationship.
A footnote to the Court's conclusory statement on the property issue con-
tained the sole acknowledgment by the Court that there might be something
questionable about characterizing trade secrets as property.9" Although
EPA stipulated that Monsanto had some property rights in the submitted
data, EPA's brief contested that the data was property under the fifth
amendment.99 In so doing, it raised Justice Holmes's famous characteriza-
tion of trade secret law in the Du Pont case." The Court responded to
EPA's argument regarding the Du Pont point by saying that "Holmes did
not deny the existence of a property interest [in Du Pont]; he simply deemed
determination of the existence of that interest irrelevant to resolution of the
case." 10' It is, however, worth reiterating that authorities cite the Holmes
opinion in Du Pont as the source of the "modern" rule that trade secrets are
not property. 0 2 The Court concluded its response to EPA's challenge to a
property characterization for trade secrets with a citation to a 1905 Supreme
Court decision, Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 103 that made
reference to trade secrets as property. Courts in subsequent cases have un-
derstood Board of Trade as a breach of a confidential relationship case, not a
case recognizing property rights in trade secrets. " Interestingly enough,
the Board of Trade case did not even concern trade secrets. Rather, it in-
volved an effort to enforce an agreement as to distribution of price quota-
possess, use and dispose of it); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555,
596-602 (1935) (real estate lien protected); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934)
(valid contracts are property within meaning of taking clause)).
97. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1003-04.
98. Id. at 1004 n.9.
99. Brief of Appellant at 29, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (No. 83-196).
100. See id.; E.I. Du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917);
see also supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
101. Ruckelshaus, 476 U.S. at 1004 n.9. Again, the Court borrowed from Milgrim. See 1
R. MILGRIM, supra note 52, at § 1.01.
102. See supra note 55.
103. 198 U.S. 236, 250, 253 (1905). It is worth mentioning that Justice Holmes also wrote
the Board of Trade decision. Perhaps 12 years later, when he decided the Du Pont case, Justice
Holmes' views had matured on what should be called property.
104. See, e.g., Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929), cert.
denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1930).
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tions by Board members.,0o The opinion merely analogized this confidential
relationship to trade secret situations. 10 6 Even the International News Ser-
vice case, which explicitly recognized a property right in the news, cited
Board of Trade as a case enforcing a confidential relationship, not as a case
recognizing property rights in information. 1
0 7
This Article's critique of the Court's analysis is not intended to suggest
that the Court lacked a basis for its decision or that it decided the issue
wrongly on the merits.' It did, however, mischaracterize the state of the
law on property rights in information. The opinion is also devoid of any
effort to analyze the possible consequences of characterizing information as
property. Nevertheless, as we shall see in the Carpenter case, a trio of
Supreme Court decisions, namely Ruckelshaus, International News Service,
and Board of Trade, have become the backbone of the information as prop-
erty doctrine, as if it was now a well-established principle of law.
III. CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES: INFORMATION AS PROPERTY IN A
MAIL AND WIRE FRAUD SCHEME
R. Foster Winans was a reporter for the Wall Street Journal (Journal),
and one of two authors who regularly contributed to the popular "Heard On
the Street" column that appeared daily in the Journal."° The column dis-
cussed particular stocks or groups of stocks, giving positive or negative eval-
uations of them. Because of the perceived quality and integrity of its
assessments, the column became an influential source of recommendations
about securities." 0 Winans gathered information for his columns from pub-
105. Board of Trade, 198 U.S. at 245.
106. Id. at 250.
107. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 237 (1918); see also infra
text accompanying notes 151-58 (discussing the International News Serv. majority's finding of
a quasi-property interest in news as a predicate for its unfair competition analysis).
108. Ultimately, the Court in Ruckelshaus decided that although all of the research data
was Monsanto's property, the government could not be said to have "taken" it in violation of
Monsanto's fifth amendment rights, at least as to data submitted before 1972 or after 1978,
because FIFRA did not then completely prohibit EPA from disclosing the data. Ruckelshaus
v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984). Because of this, Monsanto submitted the data to
EPA without a "reasonable investment-backed expectation" that EPA would not reveal it. Id.
at 1006-10. Because of the FIFRA provision prohibiting disclosure of trade secrets during
1972-1978, however, Monsanto did have "a reasonable investment-backed expectation" that
data submitted during this period would not be disclosed. Thus, the Court viewed any EPA
disclosure of the data submitted between 1972-1978(even in-house, as to other applications) as
a taking for which the fifth amendment would require just compensation. Id. at 1010-14. This
result seems equitable, because it gives the government the right to release safety data, except
when the statute has promised non-disclosure. Id. at 1004-14.
109. See Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316, 318 (1987).
110. Id.
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lic sources and from interviews with corporate executives. He apparently
did not use any "inside" corporate information in his columns. 1"
Trouble arose when the temptation to make money from his own recom-
mendations became too great for Winans to resist. Along with two Kidder
Peabody brokers, one of the brokers' clients, and Winans' roommate David
Carpenter, Winans began to participate in a scheme to trade in the securities
about which he was going to report in his next column." 2 Over a four-
month period, the net profits from these trades totalled about $690,000.3
Eventually, the venture was discovered and the participants were found
guilty of criminal violations of federal securities, mail, and wire fraud
laws.' 1
4
To obtain a conviction on a mail or wire fraud charge, the government
must prove that the defendants took some "money or property" in the
course of the fraud." 5 Winans argued before the Supreme Court that
neither he nor the others had taken any money or property from the Journal
or anyone else.1 6 To support his argument, Winans maintained that Mc-
Nally v. United States," 7 decided by the Court a few months earlier, pre-
cluded a finding that such an intangible right as his obligation to be a
trustworthy employee could be regarded as property within the meaning of




114. United States v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. 827, 849-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 791 F.2d
1024 (1986); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1982) (mail and wire
fraud statutes); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987)(Securities Exchange Commission Rule lOb-5,
prohibiting securities fraud).
115. Section 1341 reads, in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or
for obtaining money or property by means of false of fraudulent pretenses, represen-
tations, or promises .... for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or
attempting to do so, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail mat-
ter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or
takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be
delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is
directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, shall be fined not
more than $1000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
The wire fraud provision is very similar, except that it requires use of the telephone or other
wire communication, rather than use of the mails. See id. § 1343.
116. Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. at 320.
117. 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987).
118. See Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. at 320; see also Coffee, supra note 2, at 124-38; Note, Mc-
Nally v. United States: The Demise of the Intangible Rights Doctrine, 66 N.C.L. REV. 1035
(1988) (provides a thorough description and analysis of McNally).
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government's argument that the intangible right of citizens to expect govern-
ment employees not to breach their duties to perform as honest government
servants could be property under the mail and wire fraud statutes.1 19 Be-
cause Carpenter, like McNally, involved a breach of trust by an employee,
Winans argued that McNally required reversal of the mail and wire fraud
convictions.
The lower court decisions in Carpenter only superficially analyzed the
mail and wire fraud charges. Although the trial court concluded that Wi-
nans and his fellow defendants had fraudulently misappropriated or stolen
property from the Journal, it failed to specify exactly what that property
was, or to cite any authority identifying that which Winans had taken as
property within the meaning of the mail and wire fraud law.12° The court of
appeals decision' 2' similarly dismissed without analysis Winans' challenge
to the mail and wire fraud conviction, glibly saying that "we need not dwell
at length" on Winan's conviction.' 2 2 It was clear, the court stated, that con-
fidential and nonpublic information could be property under the mail and
wire fraud statutes, citing two prior mail and wire fraud cases.' 23 In light of
the superficiality of the lower courts' decisions on the mail and wire fraud
charges, and because the appellate decision in Carpenter and the two cases
relied upon by the Court in Carpenter were decided before the Supreme
Court's rejection of the "intangible rights as property" theory in McNally,
Winans appeared to have stood a good chance to overturn his mail and wire
fraud convictions on appeal.
As the case ascended through the courts, the main focus of Carpenter had
always been the securities fraud claim. Both the district court and interme-
diate appellate court decisions devoted considerably more analysis to the is-
sues raised by the securities charge than they did to the mail fraud charge. '2 4
The dispute over the securities fraud charge turned on different interpreta-
119. 107 S. Ct. at 2879-81. The fraud in McNally involved a scheme whereby a govern-
ment employee with defacto control over the state of Kentucky's purchase of insurance poli-
cies directed the business to his co-conspirators in the insurance business, and shared in the
profits. Id. The intangible right claimed as property under the statute was the right of citizens
to honest government. Id. The Supreme Court refused to extend the reach of the mail fraud
statute to encompass this intangible right. Id. at 2882; see Note, supra note 118, at 1036-39.
120. See United States v. Carpenter, 612 F. Supp. 827, 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 791
F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987) (4-4 decision).
121. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987)
(4-4 decision).
122. Id. at 1034.
123. Id. at 1034-35 (citing United States v. Louderman, 576 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 896 (1978); United States v. Von Barta, 635 F.2d 999, 1006 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998 (1981)).
124. See Carpenter, 612 F. Supp. at 838-44; 791 F.2d at 1027-34.
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tions of the statute's proscription of insider trading. 125 Winans argued that
the securities fraud statute only reached corporate insiders, quasi-insiders,
and those who received the information from an insider or quasi-insider.
Because he fit none of these categories, he argued that he was not the type of
person toward whom the securities laws were directed. The government, on
the other hand, sought to persuade the courts to accept its theory that any-
one who "misappropriated" non-public information about the securities
could be prosecuted for securities fraud. 126 The mail and wire fraud charge
was a "backup" for the government in case the courts refused to extend the
securities laws as far as the government proposed.
In anticipation of the Supreme Court's decision in Carpenter, there was
considerable speculation about what the Court would do and why.1 27 De-
spite a general consensus that what Winans did was wrong, it appeared that
he might escape punishment. His acts resembled insider trading and other
types of securities fraud in that he made profits based on his knowledge of
information unknown to the rest of the market. Yet securities fraud statutes
have limits, and it was far from clear that Winans had transgressed them.
As it turned out, the Supreme Court was unable to resolve the securities
fraud issue in the Carpenter case. 128 Four justices voted to uphold the con-
viction on that count and four to overturn it. In keeping with Supreme
Court tradition, the Court affirmed the intermediate appellate decision,
although the affirmance was without the controlling weight that a majority
decision of the Court would have provided.' 29 The Supreme Court in Car-
125. See, e.g., Cox, Choices. Paving the Road Toward a "Definition" of Insider Trading, 39
ALA. L. REV. 381 (1988) (discussing traditional theories of the securities laws and the harm
wrought by the "misappropriation" theory of the Securities and Exchange Commission's en-
forcement strategy).
126. In its 1980 Chiarella decision, the Supreme Court seemed to invite use of a misappro-
priation theory of securities fraud to reach persons such as Chiarella, a typesetter who guessed
the identity of the target of a hostile corporate takeover while setting type for documents being
prepared in connection with the takeover, and who traded in the targets' securities. Chiarella
was not a corporate insider and had no fiduciary relationship with the investors of the traded
stock, and therefore, the Supreme Court reversed his conviction on securities fraud charges.
United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). The Court in Chiarella rejected the govern-
ment's "misappropriation" theory offered in support of the conviction, but only on the ground
that the theory had not been submitted to the jury. Id. at 235-37; see Cox, supra note 125, at
390-92 (discussing Chiarella and its contribution to the misappropriation doctrine).
127. See, e.g., Pitt & Shapiro, The Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987: A Legislative
Initiative for a Sorely Needed Clarification of the Law Against Insider Trading, 39 ALA. L.
REV. 415, 418 n. 10 (1988). See generally Symposium, Defining "Insider Trading," 39 ALA. L.
REV. 337 (1988).
128. Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316, 320 (1987).
129. See id.; Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 191-92 (1972) (equally divided Court affirms
judgment below, but affirmance carries no precedential weight); accord C. WRIGHT, THE LAW
OF FEDERAL COURTS 758 & n.26 (1983).
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penter only cryptically explains its decision as to the securities fraud claim,
and offers little insight into the reasons behind the schism of the Court. 30
The Supreme Court, however, unanimously upheld the convictions on the
mail and wire fraud counts.13' Distinguishing Carpenter from McNally, the
Court said that not all intangible rights had been disqualified from the reach
of the mail and wire fraud statutes, only those involving the rights of citizens
to honest and impartial government. 32 The Court concluded that the
"Journal, as Winans' employer, was defrauded of much more than its con-
tractual right to his honest and faithful service, an interest too ethereal in
itself to fall within the protection of the mail fraud statute, which 'had its
origin in the desire to protect individual property rights.' ,133 Observing
that both lower courts had expressly referred to the Journal's "interest in the
confidentiality of the contents and timing of the 'Heard' column as a prop-
erty right," the Court agreed, citing Ruckelshaus, Board of Trade, and Inter-
national News Service, to support its conclusion.' 34
Through trading on the 'Heard' column information, Winans had "de-
prived [the Journal] of its right of exclusive use of the information, for ex-
clusivity is an important aspect of confidential business information and of
most private property for that matter."' 35 Because Winans knew of the
Journal's policy of keeping prepublication material confidential, he should
have known that it considered this information to be its property. Winans'
use of the information was therefore a fraudulent taking of property which
could support a mail or wire fraud conviction.' 36 As in Ruckelshaus, the
Supreme Court seemed to seize upon the "property" label in order to reach a
just result without giving serious thought to the consequences for future
cases, and without perceiving what a fragile base this cluster of precedents
130. 108 S. Ct. at 320.
131. Id.
132. Id. See Coffee, supra note 2, for a critique of Carpenter from a criminal law
perspective.
133. Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. at 320 (quoting McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2881
n.8 (1987)).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 321. Coffee considers the Court's decision in Carpenter to be extraordinary
because it was a case in which the owner of the information suffered no economic loss as a
result of misuse of the information. Coffee, supra note 2, at 130.
136. "We Were Robbed," blared the headline of a Wall Street Journal (Journal) editorial
published after the Court decided Carpenter, succinctly summarizing the Journal's view. Wall
St. J., Nov. 17, 1987, at 38, col. 1. Ironically, the Court's ruling implicitly means that the
Journal could lawfully have traded in the information Winans appropriated because the Jour-
nal "owned" it, even though the Journal would thereby have profited from material, nonpublic
information, a result hardly in keeping with the spirit of the rules prohibiting insider trading.
See Cox, supra note 125, at 303.
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provides for such a significant legal proposition as the recognition of prop-
erty rights in information.
IV. INTERNATIONAL NEWS SER VICE V. ASSOCIATED PRESS: THE NEWS
AS PROPERTY
One of the cases the Supreme Court relied upon in Carpenter explicitly
recognized a property, or more precisely, a quasi-property right in a species
of information-the news. The case, decided seventy years ago, involved an
unusual factual situation and contained an analysis of the information as
property issue. In International News Service v. Associated Press, the
Supreme Court upheld an injunction prohibiting the International News Ser-
vice (INS) from publishing news gathered by the Associated Press (AP) and
published in AP newspapers. 137 The case was unusual because INS employ-
ees had, for the most part, obtained the "misappropriated" news in a lawful
manner.138 Some employees obtained the information by purchasing the
early editions of AP newspapers, and some by going to the offices of AP
newspapers and reading the AP dispatches posted on public bulletin
boards. 139
Justice Pitney's majority opinion alternated back and forth between prop-
erty and unfair competition motifs in identifying the underlying theory sup-
porting the outcome of the case."4 Over time International News Service
has come to be understood more as an unfair competition case than as a case
establishing property rights in news or any other sort of information. 41
Nevertheless, the first question that the Court posed and addressed was
whether there was any property interest in news, and it ultimately answered
that critical question in the affirmative.'4 2 While unfair competition was the
focal point of the case, the part of the opinion addressing the property-
137. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). See generally
Baird, supra note 1; Abrams, Copyright, Misappropriation, and Preemption: Constitutional and
Statutory Limits of State Law Protection, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 509.
138. International News Serv., 248 U.S. at 231-32. International News Service (INS) had
also bribed some employees of Associated Press (AP) member newspapers to furnish unpub-
lished AP news to it and had also otherwise induced AP members to give INS employees
unpublished news in violation of AP bylaws. Id. at 231. The trial court issued injunctions
against INS to prevent any more of this conduct. Id. INS did not, however, appeal these
portions of the injunction, and so they were not before the Court in its International News Serv.
decision. Id. at 232. Nevertheless, the fact that INS had committed such clearly illegal acts in
the course of its news collection from AP may have colored the court's judgment on the issue
that was before it.
139. Id. at 231.
140. See id. at 232-46; see also infra notes 144-59 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 17 and accompanying text; see also Abrams, supra note 137, at 510-11.
142. International News Serv., 248 U.S. at 234-36.
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rights-in-information issue is worth careful study because the majority's
struggle to articulate its property theory is impossible to untangle from its
unfair competition analysis. Two strong opinions from Justice Holmes and
Justice Brandeis declare their reservations concerning a property rights ap-
proach, and suggest that the majority's sweeping conclusion was unneces-
sary and imprudent.' 43 Their warnings as to the weighty implications of
recognizing private property interests in information become particularly co-
gent and instructive as the present Court appears inclined to embark on a
similar course without the degree of consideration warranted by this com-
plex issue.
A. Justice Pitney's Majority Opinion: Information as "Quasi-property"
INS based one of its arguments against recognizing property rights in the
news on copyright law.'" While newspapers at that time were capable of
being copyrighted, there was no copyright claim in the case because AP had
not secured a formal statutory copyright in the newspapers and dispatches
on bulletin boards.' 45 INS argued that copyright law provided that publica-
tion of written works without copyright notice put the works in the public
domain, and in any event, a copyright on a news report would certainly not
give the author a copyright in the news itself. 146
Although agreeing with INS that the framers of the Constitution did not
intend the copyright clause to confer exclusive rights in news to the first
reporter, 147 Justice Pitney disagreed with the conclusion that INS asked the
Court to draw from this point. He stated that the Court "need spend no
time, however, upon the general question of property in news matter at com-
mon law, or the application of the copyright act, since it seems to us the case
must turn on the question of unfair competition in business."' 48 Despite this
disclaimer, in the two paragraphs that follow, Pitney weaves back and forth
through the property and unfair competition themes of the case.
On the property side, Justice Pitney seems to have considered the news
gathered by the AP as its property during the time it was being collected and
disseminated to AP members before publication in the newspapers. 149
News, however, unlike a trade secret, cannot be exploited by maintaining
143. See infra notes 160-82 and accompanying text.
144. International News Serv., 248 U.S. at 217-21.
145. Id. at 232.
146. Id. at 217-21.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 234-35.
149. Justice Pitney characterized that undisseminated news as a "valuable property inter-
est." Id. at 235. For the context of this characterization, see text accompanying note 150.
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confidentiality. In general, "[tihe peculiar value of news," Justice Pitney
pointed out, "is in the spreading of it while it is fresh; and it is evident that a
valuable property interest in the news, as news, cannot be maintained by
keeping it secret."' 5 ° The majority thought that news, upon publication,
should be regarded as common public property. In Justice Pitney's view,
while neither party could assert a property interest in uncopyrighted news
against the public after publication, "it by no means follow[ed] that there
[was] no remaining property interest in it as between themselves."' 5 ' After
all, news was the stock in trade of both AP and INS, gathered "at the cost of
enterprise, organization, skill, labor, and money."' 52 As with any other
merchandise, both AP and INS sold and distributed news for pecuniary
gain. The Court said:
Regarding the news, therefore, as but the material out of which
both parties are seeking to make profits at the same time and in the
same field, we hardly can fail to recognize that for this purpose,
and as between them, it must be regarded as quasi-property, irre-
spective of the rights of either as against the public. '53
The majority further stated that courts in equity can treat any civil right
of a pecuniary nature as a property right, and that those, who by their hon-
est labor, acquire property are as much entitled to protection of their prop-
erty as those who had long before acquired it. "' Thus, the majority's
property analysis mainly relied on the time, money, and energy that AP
expended, and on the stock-in-trade analogy, to support its recognition of
the property or quasi-property interest AP had in the news it gathered.
In response to INS' argument that the news was "too fugitive and evanes-
cent to be the subject of property," the Court became rather impatient.
Although agreeing that such an argument might dispense with the matter in
a common law controversy, the Court found the position untenable. The
Court noted that the news had all the salient attributes of property needed to
determine that its misappropriation constituted unfair competition, espe-
cially when INS' purpose in acquiring it from AP was to use it to the disad-
vantage of its competitor.' 55 Once again, the unfair competition and
property themes intertwined.
An interesting question raised by the International News Service majority
opinion is why the Court placed the news gathered by AP in the unusual
150. International News Serv., 248 U.S. at 235.




155. Id. at 240.
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category it called "quasi-property" after publication, rather than simply rec-
ognizing full-fledged property rights. There seem to be at least three reasons
for this categorization. First, the Court regarded published news as common
property with respect to the general public. 156 Someone who buys an AP
paper or even reads a headline at the newsstand is free to communicate that
news to anyone he meets. It would be odd indeed to denominate something
common property as to one group of people but private property as to an-
other group. Quasi-property, therefore, may have denoted the unusual sta-
tus of the AP news in relation to INS better than a "private property" label
would have.
Second, even as between INS and AP, the news did not remain AP's prop-
erty forever. The injunction simply forbade INS from disseminating the AP
news "until its commercial value as news to the complainant and all of its
members has passed away." '157 Quasi-property once again may have ex-
pressed the transient quality of AP's rights better than private property.
Third, even while the news was still fresh and commercially valuable, the
injunction did not forbid INS from taking news from AP as "tips." The
Court recognized that both AP and INS, as well as other news services,
routinely searched one another's newspapers for tips on hot news items. 5
As that practice was well-established in the industry, the Court distin-
guished between the utilization of tips and the bodily appropriation of
news.1 59 The former was legal; the latter was illegal. Again, quasi-property
expressed the limited nature of AP's interest in the news in relation to INS
better than a pure private property label would have.
The majority opinion in International News Service is a most interesting
blend of property and unfair competition analysis. The Court found this
curious admixture necessary to reach an equitable result, but the validity of
its property analysis is questionable. Other opinions in the case raise serious
doubts, perhaps taking the implications of the Court's property analysis
more seriously than did the majority.
B. The Holmes Separate Opinion and the Brandeis Dissent: Doubts About
Information as Property
Both Justices Holmes and Brandeis were critical of the majority opinion
insofar as it recognized property rights in news. Both also reflected dissatis-
faction with the majority's unfair competition analysis. These two eminent
156. Id. at 236.
157. Id. at 245.
158. Id. at 243-44.
159. Id.
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justices, however, had very different reasons for their disagreement with Jus-
tice Pitney's opinion.
Justice Holmes' separate opinion, in which Justice McKenna concurred,
began by observing that property rights are creations of law."6 Property
rights, he continued, do not arise automatically from value, even if that
value is exchangeable.16' They, rather, depend on a legal judgment that rec-
ognizing a right to exclude is needed to protect against unwarranted interfer-
ences.' 62  Justice Holmes seemed to say that where protection can be
afforded without granting a right to exclude, it is unnecessary to create prop-
erty rights to resolve the problem.
Justice Holmes went on to identify an alternative means of resolving the
dispute, namely, unfair trade law.' 63 In general, he noted, unfair competi-
tion in the legal sense arises when one vendor, the defendant, either explic-
itly or implicitly represents that the product he or she is selling came from
the plaintiff, thereby depriving the plaintiff of a sale and injuring the con-
sumer who may be disappointed in not getting what he or she desired.' 
6
The false representation in the International News Service case might be
more subtle, he observed, because INS was not selling the news by represent-
ing that it came from AP, as would normally be the situation in unfair trade
cases. 165 Rather, INS was selling AP's news as its own and not ascribing
any credit to AP. Although the falsehood was the reverse of the normal
passing off situation, "the principle that condemns the one condemns the
other.' 66 The remedy Justice Holmes suggested was simply to correct the
false impression that the news came from INS by having INS acknowledge
its true source.' 67
Justice Pitney's majority opinion responds to Justice Holmes' position
that liability should rest only on INS' implied misrepresentation. While
agreeing that there was an implied misrepresentation, and that it had accen-
tuated the wrong, Justice Pitney observed that the misrepresentation was not
the essence of the wrong committed by INS against AP. 168 In Justice
Pitney's view, bodily misappropriation of the news in competition with AP
without compensation was the essential wrong. 1 69 Justice Pitney's effort to





165. Id. at 247.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 248.
168. Id. at 242.
169. Id. To use Justice Holmes' terms, the majority seems to have identified International
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reach the essence of the wrong and find an appropriate legal response to it
was admirable; Justice Holmes' proper labelling remedy does seem a rather
unsatisfactory legal response to the wrong in the case.
Justice Brandeis' famous dissent in International News Service raised seri-
ous questions, however, about the majority's legal response to the essence of
the wrong. Quite in agreement with the majority opinion that INS had ac-
ted unjustly toward AP, 7 ° Justice Brandeis simply disagreed that judicial
creation of a property right in news was an appropriate response. More was
at stake in the case than righting an injustice. To give relief required more
than the application of old rules to new facts; it required making a new
rule. 7 ' Although the common law over the years had created new rules to
deal with new situations, Justice Brandeis thought that this situation so se-
verely affected the public interest that such an approach was dangerous.
At least two aspects of the majority position seemed to trouble Justice
Brandeis. The first was the boundlessness of the right created by the major-
ity. 172 Was anyone who spent time, money, and energy on something now
to have a property, or even quasi-property, right in it, so that no one else
could make use of it and "reap whereof he had not sown"?' 73 The majority
opinion did not articulate the boundaries, if any, that would confine the
reach of the property right it recognized.
Justice Brandeis' fear of the dangers presented by a boundless tort of this
sort proved to be well-founded. In the first decade after this opinion, Inter-
national News Service misappropriation suits became quite common, until
the courts began confining International News Service virtually to its facts, so
that the claim fell into disuse.' 74 Long dormant, the International News Ser-
vice misappropriation tort has enjoyed something of a comeback in the last
decade or two. 75 Decisions such as Ruckelshaus and Carpenter may rein-
force this trend.
Second, Justice Brandeis charged that the majority opinion ignored the
public's interest in the dissemination of news, an omission that he found
News Serv. as a situation requiring recognition of a right to exclude as necessary to protect
against unwarranted intrusions. See supra text accompanying notes 154-55.
170. Id. at 262 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 262-63.
173. Id. at 239-40 (Pitney, J.). The majority opinion stressed this consideration. Id.
174. See, e.g., E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 17, at 36-39; see also Baird, supra note
1, at 420-22; Abrams, supra note 137, at 511. Another reason for the demise of International
News Serv. misappropriation suits was because International News Serv. was a federal common
law case decided before Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
175. See, e.g., Standard & Poor's Corp. v. Commodity Exchange, Inc., 683 F.2d 704 (2d
Cir. 1982); see also Reback & Hayes, Copyright Gone Astray: The Misappropriation Alternative,
COMPUTER LAW., Apr. 1986, at 3.
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deeply disturbing. 76 The AP argued for a rule that would not only be a
significant extension of property rights, but also would seriously curtail the
free use of knowledge. "The general rule of law," said Justice Brandeis, is
that "the noblest of human productions-knowledge, truths ascertained,
conceptions, and ideas-become, after voluntary communication to others,
free as the air to common use."
177
Justice Brandeis recognized the existence of exceptions to this general
rule. "Upon these incorporeal productions the attribute of property is con-
tinued after such communication only in certain classes of cases where pub-
lic policy has seemed to demand it,' 71 8 and then only when the legislature
has undertaken to define the boundaries of such rights, as in the patent and
copyright statutes. In Justice Brandeis' opinion, the injustice perpetrated by
INS should have been righted, if at all, by the legislature. 179
This approach has much to recommend it, and is consistent with the man-
ner in which copyrights and patent rights are secured. The legislature stands
in a better position to take into account all the ramifications of the decision
to recognize property in information and to craft a rule balancing the com-
peting interests appropriately.' 8 0 As Justice Brandeis himself pointed out,
the legislature might, for example, fashion a rule that protected the news
against appropriation, but put a gatherer of it under an obligation to supply
it to others for a reasonable price without discrimination.' 8' As Justice
Brandeis noted, half of the newspaper readers in the nation read non-AP
newspapers. The major reason that INS had been taking AP news was that
it had been unable to obtain war news, not because it was unwilling to go to
the expense of gathering it, but because foreign governments had cut INS
out of the normal channels of cabling foreign news back to the United
176. International News Serv., 248 U.S. at 250-51, 263-67 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The
only place the majority opinion arguably expressed any concern about the public interest in
news dissemination was in connection with an economic argument Justice Pitney used to sup-
port his conclusion. Noting that news gathering was an expensive enterprise, he observed that
AP needed to recoup this expense if its newspaper, and the company itself, were to remain in
business. While Justice Pitney did not directly state that if firms like INS were permitted to
pirate the news at issue, AP's incentives for incurring the expense of gathering the news would
be undermined, and the public would therefore suffer if AP reduced its newsgathering efforts,
that thought arguably is implicit in this portion of Justice Pitney's opinion. See id. at 240-41.
(Pitney, J.); see also supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
177. Id. at 250 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 263-67.
180. But see Baird, supra note 1, at 420 (questioning whether legislatures are truly better
situated to make good decisions about such matters).
181. See International News Serv., 248 U.S. at 266-67. This appears to be Brandeis' answer
to Pitney's economic argument discussed supra at note 176.
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States.'8 2 The European war at that time was of great importance and in-
tense interest to the public. INS faced a serious dilemma. It could not ig-
nore the public's interest in news of such importance. It had to publish what
it could acquire by any means to meet the demand. If INS had offered to
pay AP for this news, and AP refused, the public might have suffered from
the shutout, not just INS. Justice Brandeis considered these facts to be of
crucial significance, yet the majority opinion entirely ignored them.
In sum, the oft-cited Brandeis dissent in International News Service repre-
sents a classic statement of the Enlightenment point of view that has long
permeated American intellectual property law, and copyright law in particu-
lar. The doubts it expresses about creating property rights in news or infor-
mation in general are typical of this traditional approach of the law toward
protecting information as property. This Article raises the question whether
the times-and the economy-have undergone such extensive change that
the Enlightenment position is no longer persuasive, or, at least, no longer
persuasive to the same degree as before.
V. INFORMATION AS COMMODITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE: ARE
PROPERTY RIGHTS NEEDED?
It is too early to tell whether the Ruckelshaus and Carpenter decisions
presage a new wind in the law's attitude toward recognizing property rights
in information, or whether they represent aberrational decisions understand-
able solely in light of the equitable circumstances they presented and the
need to resort to recognition of some property interest to reach an equitable
result. Neither decision, it should be noted, called for issuance of an injunc-
tion to stop the dissemination of information.
Both decisions, however, can be criticized for the weakness of their analy-
ses supporting information as property conclusions. Little precedent exists
to support the Court's conclusion in either case, and the Court did not make
a persuasive case for this important proposition independently. Even more
unfortunately, at present, there is no Justice Brandeis or Justice Holmes on
the Court to raise questions about the wisdom of making such broad pro-
nouncements on what is essentially a new and radically different perspective
on the law's attitude toward information. No Justice in either recent case
questioned the information as property point, either in concurrence or in
dissent. Perhaps this very unanimity is the most telling sign of all: The
traditional reluctance of intellectual property law to recognize information
as property may be giving way to a new legal approach, one which embraces
information as property in the Information Age.
182. International News Sery.. 248 U.S. at 263-64.
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Of the two Supreme Court decisions, the Carpenter case is more dis-
turbing. After all, the data in Ruckelshaus were fixed in a tangible form,
were identified by Monsanto as trade secrets, and had clear commercial
value to Monsanto. 8 3 Although the "modern rule" has been that trade
secrets are not property, 84 there is some authority to support a property
characterization for trade secrets."' The Carpenter case, however, involves
quite a different set of circumstances. While there is no question that Wi-
nans violated company policy and abused the trust that the Journal placed in
him, 186 it strains the bounds of reason to say that he knew or should have
known that the Journal would regard his own stock recommendations and
its publication schedule as its "property."' 8 7 The notion that the Journal
owns whatever information its reporters may gather, whether from public
domain sources or otherwise, is a highly dubious proposition. If Carpenter is
to be taken at face value, employee "whistleblowing" on company wrongdo-
ing would now seem potentially actionable as a misappropriation of the em-
ployer's property. 8 Perhaps the first amendment's protection of free
183. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 906, 998-99, 1002-04 (1984).
184. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
186. See United States v. Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. 316, 320 (1987).
187. See id. at 319. In McNally, the Court's concerns about the ambiguity of mail and wire
fraud statutes and the need to provide adequate notice of possible criminal liability influenced
its decision to reverse the convictions based on the intangible rights theory. See McNally v.
United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2881-82 (1987). The same ambiguity and notice issues were
present in Carpenter, yet the Court in this later case ignored them.
188. Justice Brandeis' complaints about the International News Serv. majority opinion,
namely the boundlessness of the right created and the lack of awareness of the substantial
social implications of recognizing raw information as property, are also present in the Carpen-
ter decision. 108 S. Ct. at 320-2 1; see also Coffee, supra note 2, at 123; supra text accompanying
notes 153, 163, 167. The Court's property analysis in Carpenter may have at least partially
resurrected the "intangible rights" doctrine the Court rejected earlier in the year, for both
cases involved breach of trust, a theory of liability resting on considerations other than prop-
erty rights. Another possible source of partial or wholesale revival of the "intangible rights"
doctrine can be found in an obscure provision Congress added to its election year overhaul of
the federal drug laws where Congress also amended the mail and wire fraud statutes:
Sec. 7603. Definition for Mail Fraud Chapter of Title 18, United States Code. (a) IN
GENERAL- Chapter 63 of title 18 of the United States Code is amended by adding
at the end the following: § 1346. Definition of 'scheme or artifice to defraud'
"For purposes of this chapter, the term 'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a
scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services."
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (to be codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C. § 1346).
Interestingly, Congress chose to amend the definition of "scheme or artifice to defraud." It
stopped short of explicitly characterizing "the intangible right of honest services" as property.
The amendment instead clarifies that a deprivation of this right constitutes an artifice to de-
fraud, prohibited by the mail and wire fraud statutes. While the amendment was intended to
overrule McNally, Congress did not reach the issue of whether "intangible rights" fraud oper-
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speech interests will serve as some check on the reach of the information as
property doctrine. 8 9
These two cases are not the only signs of changing attitudes in the law
regarding the benefits of free dissemination of information. The export con-
trol laws of the United States make the exchange of technical or scientific
information-even in conversation with a foreigner on United States soil-
an export of technical data requiring authorization by an export control li-
cense.' 90 Similarly, the patent system permits issuance of secrecy orders to
prevent disclosure of inventions having national security implications, in-
cluding those not designated as classified. 191 Reagan administration propos-
als would have limited the exchange of scientific information, for example,
by attempting to forbid scientists from attending scientific conferences to
deliver papers and to give the government power to control sensitive but
unclassified information.' 92 The Commerce Department has also embarked
on a course of increased involvement in intellectual property policy because
intellectual property exports are one of the few areas where the United States
enjoys a positive balance of trade. Increased respect for United States intel-
lectual property rights throughout the world would result in an increase of
this already favorable balance. As a consequence, intellectual property con-
cerns now find their way into General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) negotiations. 93
ates to deprive the victim of any "property". See 134 CONG. REC. H 11,251 (daily ed. Oct. 21,
1988) (remarks of Rep. Conyers).
189. A strict information-as-property approach to the famous "Pentagon Papers" case
would have provided a rationale for restraining the New York Times, as the receiver of stolen
property, from publishing portions of a Defense Department study of Vietnam War policy. In
that case, however, the first amendment shielded the New York Times from such a prior
restraint. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). On the other hand, the
first amendment did not save Samuel Morison from conviction on espionage charges for giving
photographs of a Soviet naval facility to a news periodical for publication. See United States v.
Morison, 884 F.2d 1057, 1071 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 259 (1988).
190. See 15 C.F.R § 379. l(b)(2) (1988). See generally Letterman, United States Regulation
of High Technology Exports, 20 INT'L LAW. 1147 (1986); NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES,
BALANCING THE NATIONAL INTERESTS: U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY EXPORT CONTROLS
AND GLOBAL COMPETITION (1987).
191. See 35 U.S.C. § 181 (1982). See generally 1 D. CHISUM, supra note 50, at § 1.06
(patent secrecy orders).
192. See, e.g., Chalk, Death of a Data Directive, 90 TECH. REV. 13-14 (1987) (discussing a
national security directive to give the government control over "sensitive" but unclassified
information); see also D. NELKIN, SCIENCE AS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1984) (discussing
the effects of a trend to treat scientific research as intellectual property and restrict its dissemi-
nation); Eisenberg, Academic Freedom and Academic Values in Sponsored Research, 66 TEX.
L. REV. 1363 (1988).
193. See, e.g., Note, Intellectual Property Rights and the GA T: U.S. Goals in the Uruguay
Round,. 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 367, 372 (1988).
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While these examples represent but a few manifestations of a more
proprietarian and anti-dissemination attitude toward information than that
which the law has previously displayed, this should not be surprising in light
of the great extent to which the economy now depends on the production
and sale of information.' 9 4 New technologies, particularly computers, are
causing significant changes in the way information is produced and distrib-
uted, and this may necessitate changes in intellectual property law.' 95
It will be no small task to determine what changes in intellectual property
law should be adopted to address problems presented by this transformation
of the economy and what changes should be resisted to avoid stifling socially
desirable exchanges of particular forms of information.
Once courts have passed the initial threshold issue by deciding that infor-
mation can be property, they will inevitably address a host of even more
difficult and complex questions. The next step will be the challenging task of
defining information, articulating the circumstances in which certain infor-
mation is or is not property, and explaining why these circumstances war-
rant a property designation and others do not. The recent Ruckelshaus and
Carpenter decisions do not take up this challenging task. In both decisions,
the Court failed to proceed cautiously and did not attempt to limit the reach
of its property analysis, let alone foresee the implications of the characteriza-
tion it invoked.
Clearly, the word property is a very powerful metaphor that radically
changes the stakes in legal disputes.' 9 6 Once a property interest is estab-
lished, the law provides a wide range of legal protections for it, a much wider
range, particularly in the criminal law area, than for breaches of trust or
confidence, or other specific kinds of unfair conduct. 97
194. See, e.g., OTA REPORT, supra note 5, at 40-41.
195. As the Office of Technology Assessment's Report observes:
Intellectual property law is increasingly outdated in providing appropriate incentives
for the production and distribution of many information-based goods. Because of
this, markets may increasingly fail to provide economically and socially efficient vari-
eties of information. In trying to remedy information market failures, policymakers
face tradeoffs among interests with high stakes in intellectual property debates.
When they enact changes in intellectual property law, they may be required to make
some explicit decisions about the actual nature, content, and distribution of goods
based on information.
Id. at 157.
196. See, e.g., Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1987)
(discussing "property" and "regulatory" theories of copyright protection).
197. The Carpenter case provides an apt illustration of this point. If all Winans had done
wrong was to breach a duty of loyalty he owed to his employer, he could not have been con-
victed of mail or wire fraud. If, however, one recharacterizes his action as a taking of prop-




What we now refer to as intellectual property law has long been part of
unfair competition law.19" As long as unfair competition is the predominant
motif of this area of law, a defendant has considerable leeway to challenge
the plaintiff's assertion that hard competition engaged in by the defendant
was so hard as to be "unfair." If the ground shifts and the plaintiff can
assert that a taking of property has occurred, the range of defenses is nar-
rowed. Slowly but surely, the property motif is gaining strength in intellec-
tual property law, changing the balance of power in legal disputes.199
An example may help to clarify this abstract generalization. If one be-
lieves that copyright law creates a property interest in a copyrighted work,
then anyone who makes an unauthorized copy of it is a thief. It matters not
whether the copier might be making the copy at home only for his or her
own private purpose. If one instead believes that copyright law is a regula-
tory statute aimed at preventing unfair competition, then private home copy-
ing is not the kind of conduct the statute was intended to address and is
therefore not infringement. 2" While one recent Office of Technology As-
sessment report concludes that Congress has not made an explicit judgment
on the private use copying problem, and has not made a choice between the
property and the regulatory model for copyright, 20 1 clearly, copyright own-
ers generally desire the stronger protection that the recognition of property
rights affords.20 2 On this issue, the public and copyright owners differ con-
siderably, for the general public appears to think that home copying is not
and should not be illegal.20 3 A policy choice between the regulatory and
property models thus would have dispositive consequences in this particular
controversy.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article does not presume to resolve the weighty issue of whether or
not information is considered property. Its goal is more modest: To review
198. To illustrate, currently available casebooks that attempt to cover more than one intel-
lectual property subject in any depth evince a clear orientation toward "unfair competition"
rather than "property" concepts. See, e.g., E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 17; S. OP-
PENHEIM, G. WESTON, P. MAGGS, & R. SCHECTER, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AND CON-
SUMER PROTECTION, CASES AND COMMENTS (4th ed. 1983); see also B. PATTISHALL & D.
HILLIARD, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICE, CASES AND MATERIALS
(1985); C. MCMANIS, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES IN A NUTSHELL (2d ed. 1988).
199. Patterson, supra note 196, at 59-62.
200. Id. at 40-48.
201. OTA REPORT, supra note 5, at 192.
202. See, e.g., id. at 99-121 (concerning efforts of intellectual property owners to combat
"piracy" of their products).
203. Id. at 122.
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two recent cases which have taken a dramatic plunge into a sea of as yet
unknown consequences by declaring that information is property, to point
out the weaknesses in the rationales offered by the Court for this proposition,
and to urge more caution in using property labels in legal disputes concern-
ing information. The traditional view of information as something not own-
able may still be viable; at a minimum, it may deserve an arena in which to
operate. In order for the information economy to prosper in the Information
Age, it simply may not be necessary or desireable to adopt a general legal
doctrine that information is property.
However, to the extent that information is coming to be regarded as prop-
erty, there is a clear need for some serious thought about how to draw lines
between information that can be protected as property and information that
cannot. One possible line of demarcation which would be consistent with
the two recent Supreme Court decisions is that secret information is pro-
tectible as property until no longer secret. Another possible line might dis-
tinguish between complex patterns of information that have been fixed in
some medium, such as the research results Monsanto submitted to EPA,
which could be property, and individual or unfixed isolated bits of data, such
as the Winans' stock recommendations, which would not be property. We
must approach the process of drawing such distinctions carefully and delib-
erately, with full appreciation of the consequences of their inherent charac-
terizations. A world in which all information is property under all
circumstances is, at present, unthinkable. But arriving at a coherent theory
concerning when information is property, and when it is not, is a task to
which little thought has been given, and much must be.
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